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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final order of the district 
court denying plaintiff's constitutional! 
adoptive placement of an illegitimate intf 
relinquished by the mother to LDS Social Services and placed 
with adoptive parents on June 12, 1987. The Court of Appeals 
has jurisdiction of this case pursuant td> Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2a-3(2)(g). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether defendants1 conduct constituted sufficient 
"state action" to invoke the asserted constitutional protections. 
2. Whether the district court correctly ruled that 
U.C.A. §78-30-4, as applied in this case] does not violate the 
equal protection provision of either the Utah or United States 
Constitution. 
3. Whether the district court correctly ruled that 
U.C.A. §78-30-4(3), as applied in this c^se, does not violate 
the due process provision of either the tytah or United States 
Constitution. 
4. Whether the plaintiff-appellaitt properly preserved 
the claim that U.C.A. §78-30-4(3)(c) violates Article I, Section 
11 of the Utah Constitution. 
CONTROLLING AUTHORITIES 
Resolution of the issues presented! on appeal will be 
determined by construction of the following authorities, which 
are set out verbatim in the Addendum (Add}. 26-27): 
1. U.C.A. §§78-30-4 and 78-30-12; 
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2. Utah Constitution Art. I, §§7, 11, and 24; 
3. United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, §1. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action by the putative father of an 
illegitimate infant to prevent the infant's adoption by adoptive 
parents with whom the infant was placed by LDS Social Services 
following lawful relinquishment of the infant by the mother. (R. 
2.) The district court denied plaintiff's motion for a 
preliminary injunction (R. 68, Add. 1-4) and subsequently 
granted defendants' motion for summary judgment (R. 190, Add. 
6-7). Plaintiff appealed from the summary judgment. (R. 193.) 
On appeal, a panel of this Court has previously denied 
plaintiff's motions for summary reversal and injunction pending 
appeal. (Add. 24-25.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's Brief does not accurately set forth the facts 
of this case. The Brief attempts to characterize plaintiff 
variously as a "willing and responsible" (App. Br. 11), "fit and 
willing" (App. Br. 12), "caring and involved" (App. Br. 13) 
father. However, the documented facts demonstrate otherwise. 
This action was originally filed in the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah; however, that court 
dismissed the action under the abstention doctrine on the 
grounds that it involves domestic relations matters over which 
state courts have traditionally exercised exclusive control. 
See Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Services, 670 F. Supp. 1537, 1545-46 
(D. Utah 1987). 
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home in Salt Lake 
action, included in 
pp. 3-9; Paxman Aff't, 
[ Conclusions of Law and 
Plaintiff is a 22-year-old singlei black man who, at all 
times relevant to this action, has resided in an apartment in 
Salt Lake County. In late 1985 he began dating Penny Paxman, a 
20-year-old single white woman who, at a^ Ll times relevant to 
this action, has resided at her parents' 
County. (Swayne Dep. from federal court 
record of this case beginning at R. 109, 
R. 96, Add. 11; Amended Findings of Fact 
Order Denying Preliminary Injunction, hereinafter "Findings," R. 
68, 1111 1-2, Add. 1-2; I Tr. 8, 30). Throughout the time 
plaintiff dated Penny, before and during the pregnancy, and even 
after the baby's birth, plaintiff continued to date and engage 
in sexual relations with other women. Because of plaintiff's 
unstable financial circumstances, Penny iften paid plaintiff's 
rent and living expenses and loaned plaintiff her car for up to 
four or five days a week. (I Tr. 24-25, 138-39; Swayne Dep. 
7-16, 22-25; Paxman Aff't H 5, Add. 12.) 
When plaintiff learned in October of 1986 that Penny was 
pregnant, he became angry and, until Marqh of 1987, denied that 
the baby was his. (Paxman Aff't If 2, Add. 11; I Tr. 9, 27; 
I 
Swayne Dep. 26.) Plaintiff refused to m^rry Penny because, "It 
didn't appeal to me." (Swayne Dep. 31-32.) In fact, at no time 
"I Tr." refers to the transcript of the first part of 
the preliminary injunction hearing, identified as R. 203, and 
"II Tr." will refer to the separately bou|nd transcript of the 
second part of the same hearing, identified as R. 204. 
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prior to relinquishment of the baby to LDS Social Services did 
plaintiff ever offer to marry Penny or to live with and support 
her and the baby. (Findings, HIT 3-4, Add. 2.) Following the 
relinquishment plaintiff proposed a secret, "paper" marriage to 
enhance this court case, but they still would not have lived 
together so Penny refused. (I Tr. 25-28; Paxman Aff't IF 4, Add. 
12. ) 
Penny discussed with plaintiff during the pregnancy the 
possibility of placing the baby for adoption, explaining that 
her parents favored adoption because of the baby's racial mix 
and the couple's racial and religious incompatibility. In fact, 
Penny called and made an appointment with LDS Social Services in 
March of 1987 to discuss adoption, but later decided to postpone 
the appointment. (Paxman Aff't H 3, Add. 11-12; Findings, H 5, 
Add. 2; Swayne Dep. 33-34, 54-55; II Tr. 16-17.) Plaintiff 
suggested to Penny that if she kept the baby she and the baby 
could live with plaintiff's mother in the mother's apartment. 
However, plaintiff made it clear that Penny would be expected to 
support herself and the baby and pay half of his mother's rent. 
Thus, Penny would have ended up subsidizing the rent of both 
plaintiff and his mother. (I Tr. 28-30; Paxman Aff't If 4, Add. 
12.) 
Penny's baby was born in a Salt Lake City hospital on 
June 4, 1987. Plaintiff was present in the hospital at the time 
of the birth and visited Penny and the baby in the hospital. 
(Paxman Aff't II 6, Add. 12.) Hospital personnel explained to 
-4-
Penny that in the case of an unmarried mbther the father's name 
cannot be entered on the birth certificate unless the father 
signs an Acknowledgment of Paternity for|n, supplied by the 
hospital, signifying his "willingness and intent to support 
[the] child to the best of [his] ability." (See Brockert Aff't 
and Exhibits, R. 105, Add. 20-23.) Penny informed plaintiff of 
the acknowledgment requirement and showed him the form that he 
would have to sign to have his name placed on the birth 
certificate, but he refused to sign it. Consequently, the 
baby's birth certificate shows no fatheri and the baby was given 
Penny's surname. Penny's mother checked her and the baby out of 
the hospital on June 6, and Penny took the baby home to her 
parents' house. Plaintiff assumed no financial responsibility 
for the hospital expenses or for the subsequent support of Penny 
and the baby. (Paxman Aff't If 6 and Exhibit, Add. 12-13, 15; I 
Tr. 31-34; II Tr. 17-18, 38; Findings, Iff 6-8.) 3 
Penny subsequently decided to meetf 
Services regarding possible placement of 
and an appointment was made for Monday, June 8, 1987 at 4:00 
p.m. Penny took the baby at the appointed time and, with her 
parents, met and counseled with Elda C. Bowen regarding the 
adoption process. Mrs. Bowen inquired irjto the situation with 
with LDS Social 
the baby for adoption, 
Plaintiff claims to have paid the "expenses associated 
with his daughter's birth." (App. Br. 17| 
paid none of the hospital or doctor billsj 
At most, he paid one $45 doctor bill for 
check-ups. (II Tr. 5, 8.) 
) The truth is, he 
related to the birth, 
lone of Penny's prenatal 
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the baby's father, and Penny responded that he had no interest 
in marriage or in living with and supporting her and the baby. 
Mrs. Bowen discussed the available options with Penny, stressed 
that Penny should do what she thought best for herself and the 
baby, and even offered temporary foster care for the baby until 
Penny made her decision. Penny considered and weighed all the 
circumstances, including plaintiff's lack of commitment to her 
and the baby, her inability to support and rear the baby alone, 
the problems of bringing a racially-mixed baby into a possible 
marriage with another man, future visitation rights, plaintiff's 
continued involvement with other women, and the fact that 
plaintiff had previously fathered a baby out of wedlock and 
consented to its adoption. In view of those considerations, 
Penny concluded that adoption would be in the baby's best 
interests. (Paxman Aff't fllf 5, 7 Add. 12-13; Bowen Aff't 1I1I 
1-5, R. 101, Add. 16-17; I Tr. 13-15, 31, 34-40; II Tr. 2-3; 
Swayne Dep. 11-17.) 
After Penny expressed her decision to relinquish the baby 
for adoption, Mrs. Bowen telephoned the Bureau of Vital 
Statistics of the Utah Department of Health and determined that 
no claim of paternity had been registered for Penny's baby. 
Mrs. Bowen then read and discussed with Penny the "Affidavit and 
Release" form by which the relinquishment would be effected. 
Penny stated that she understood the form and its legal 
significance. She then signed the form, transferring legal 
custody and control of the baby to LDS Social Services. Because 
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ces transferred custody 
parents, with whom the 
s that afternoon, Penny 
of the lateness of the hour, Mrs. Bowen permitted Penny to take 
the baby home that night, and she returned the baby the next 
day. On June 12, 1987, LDS Social Servi 
and control of the baby to the adoptive 
baby has resided for the past year. (Paxban Aff't Ulf 8-9, Add. 
13-14; Bowen Aff't 1W 6-8 and Exhibit, Add. 17-19; I Tr. 15, 41; 
II Tr. 3-4; Findings 11 9, Add. 3.) 
Plaintiff places great emphasis on events that occurred 
after Penny relinquished legal custody ot the baby to LDS Social 
Services. While those events are immaterial, a response is 
required to correct the record. On Tuesday, June 9, before 
returning the baby to LDS Social Service 
took the baby to plaintiff's apartment si he could see the baby 
one last time. There is no mention in Appellant's Brief of the 
fact that while Penny and the baby were there, one of 
plaintiff's other girlfriends also dropped in for a visit. And 
contrary to plaintiff's claims, there is 
record of any other visit of Penny and the baby to his 
apartment. (I Tr. 15, 42-43.) Plaintiff" also claims that Penny 
called him "each day" of her trip to California and deceived him 
about having the baby with her. (App. Br. 4.) The only calls 
were on Wednesday and Saturday, June 10 and 13. More 
importantly, the reason Penny delayed telling plaintiff that she 
had relinquished the baby was that she fqared he would do 
physical harm to her and her family. (I 
After learning of the relinquishment! 
no evidence in the 
Tr. 15-16, 44-49.) 
, plaintiff registered a 
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belated claim of paternity on June 15, 1987 and attempted to 
amend the birth certificate to add his name. However, plaintiff 
has testified that if he were to obtain custody of the child, he 
would give the child to his sister "to raise" until some 
indefinite time when he might become "more stable." (I Tr. 
17-18; Swayne Dep. 28-30; Findings If 12, Add. 3.) 
Plaintiff filed suit, alleging two "causes of action." 
The first requests relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for alleged 
violation of federal constitutional rights under color of state 
law, and the second seeks a declaratory judgment that U.C.A. 
§78-30-4, facially and as applied, violates the equal protection 
and due process provisions of the federal and state 
constitutions. (R. 2-5.) 
The district court denied plaintiff's motion for a 
preliminary injunction, concluding that success on the merits 
was unlikely because, among other findings: 
13. It was not impossible for plaintiff to have 
filed his notice of claim of paternity prior to the date 
the child was relinquished for adoption. 
14. Throughout the pregnancy, plaintiff did not 
behave in a manner consistent with that of a concerned, 
committed father, nor did he clearly articulate an intent 
or desire to assume the responsibilities of parenthood or 
to keep and rear the child. [R. 70, Add. 3.] 
The district court subsequently granted defendants summary 
judgment, concluding that there was no "state action" to invoke 
the claimed constitutional protections, and that section 78-30-4 
is constitutionally valid on its face and as applied in this 
case. (R. 190-91, Add. 6-7.) 
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A panel of this Court denied plaintiff's motions for 
summary reversal and injunction pending Appeal. (Add. 24-25.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT « 
right of consent on the 
Neither LDS Social Services nor the adoptive parents 
engaged in "state action" by accepting the relinquishment and 
adoptive placement of the illegitimate child. Adoptive 
placement of illegitimate children is historically a private, 
nongovernmental function, and the fact that LDS Social Services 
is licensed by the State or that it acted pursuant to State law 
does not convert otherwise private action into state action. 
U.C.A. §78-30-4 does not violate equal protection by 
requiring the consent of the mother for ^option of illegitimate 
children while conditioning the father's 
timely registration of a claim of paternity. Cases from both 
the Utah Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court 
recognize that the mother's parental right is vested by virtue 
of her role in bearing and caring for thq 
father's right remains inchoate until he 
develops a substantial relationship with 
assumption of paternal responsibilities, 
responsibility for, and developed no relationship with, the 
child. Therefore, equal protection does not require that he be 
i 
accorded rights similar to those of the mother. 
U.C.A. §78-30-4(3) was applied consistent with the 
demands of due process because it adequately protected 
plaintiff's opportunity to develop a relationship with his 
child, whereas the 
comes forward and 
the child through 
Plaintiff assumed no 
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illegitimate child. Plaintiff's relationship with the child was 
purely biological, and plaintiff failed to take the actions 
within his control, i.e., marriage or timely registration of 
paternity, to perfect his paternal rights and ensure a full 
paternal relationship. Plaintiff is presumed to know the law, 
he knew of the time and place of birth, and it was not 
"impossible" for plaintiff to register his paternity "through no 
fault of his own." 
Finally, plaintiff's assertion that section 78-30-4(3)(c) 
violates the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution was 
neither argued nor decided in the district court; therefore, the 
argument may not be raised on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
On appeal, plaintiff has abandoned his attack on the 
facial validity of U.C.A. §78-30-4, now claiming only that it is 
unconstitutional as applied. Plaintiff also failed to challenge 
or discuss the district court's threshold ruling that defendants 
engaged in no state action sufficient to invoke the cited 
constitutional protections. (See App. Br. 1, 5.) Since neither 
issue was raised or briefed in the Appellant's Brief, both 
issues must be deemed abandoned and neither may be reached by 
this Court. See, e.g., Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Bastian, 657 
P.2d 1346, 1348 (Utah 1983); Brubaker v. Branine, 237 Kan. 488, 
701 P.2d 929, 931 (1985); Sanchez v. Connecticut General Life 
Ins. Co., 681 P.2d 974, 976 (Colo. App. 1984). With the 
district court's state action ruling unchallenged and intact, 
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this Court need not reach the merits of the constitutional 
claims. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982). 
Moreover, plaintiff's failure to brief the state constitutional 
issues separately from the federal constitutional issues also 
precludes consideration of the state law issues on this appeal. 
See State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208, 1211 n.2 (Utah 1987); State 
v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 805-06 (Utah 1986p. 
Nevertheless, defendants here bri^f all the relevant 
issues to demonstrate the correctness of the result reached by 
the district court. 
POINT I: DEFENDANTS' CONDUCT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE SUFFICIENT 
STATE ACTION TO INVOKE THE ASSERTED CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROTECTIONS. 
It has been long settled that the due process and equal 
protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment apply only to 
"state action," not to acts of private persons or entities. 
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 837 (1982). Likewise 42 
U.S.C. §1983, which was enacted to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment, applies only to deprivation of federal constitutional 
rights "under color of state law." id. at 838. The statutory 
construed as 
of the Fourteenth 
"under color of state law" requirement is) 
equivalent to the "state action" element 
Amendment. Ld. Thus, the sum test for r[elief under section 
1983 is as follows: 
The ultimate issue in determining wnether a person is 
subject to suit under §1983 is the 
cases arising under the Fourteenth 
alleged infringement of federal rights "fairly 
attributable to the State?" [Id.] 
same question posed in 
Amendment: is the 
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Private action may be attributed to the State only when the 
State "has exercised coercive power or has provided such 
significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the 
[action] must in law be deemed to be that of the State." Id. 
at 840. 
For example, in Rendell-Baker the Supreme Court held that 
a non-profit, private school's discharge of certain employees 
did not constitute state action, even though the school received 
public funds, was regulated by the State, and performed a 
"public function." Similarly, in Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 
(1982), the Court held that a private nursing home's decision to 
transfer Medicaid patients to lower levels of care did not 
constitute state action, despite "extensive regulation" and 
indirect involvement by the State in the transfer decision. See 
also Sumpter v. Harper, 683 F.2d 106, 108 (4th Cir. 1982) 
(licensing of physicians does not create state action); Henig v. 
Odorioso, 385 F.2d 491, 494 (3rd Cir. 1967) (conduct of private 
orphanage was not state action). 
Similarly, the due process and equal protection 
provisions of the Utah Constitution, Art. I, §§7 and 24, are 
intended to protect individual rights against infringement by 
the government. They have no application to the conduct of 
private persons or entities. As noted in Hulbert v. State, 607 
P.2d 1217, 1223 (Utah 1980), "these provisions were designed to 
protect the individual from state action." 
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LDS Social Services engaged in no "state action" in 
accepting temporary custody of the baby from Penny and in 
placing the baby with adoptive parents, ^nd the adoptive parents 
did not engage in "state action" by accenting and maintaining 
custody and care of the baby. LDS Social Services is a private, 
nonprofit welfare agency licensed by the State of Utah as a 
qualified child placement agency pursuant to U.C.A. §55-Ba-l et 
seg. (Brown Aff't U 2, R. 94, Add. 9.) jHowever, that is the 
extent of its contact with the State. LIt>S Social Services 
receives no government funding, and no governmental agency or 
entity is involved in its internal operations, affairs, or 
decisions. More importantly, no governmental agency was 
involved in the relinquishment, acceptance, or adoptive 
placement of Penny Paxman's baby. (Brown Aff't 1f1f 3-5, Add. 
9-10.) 
The Utah Supreme Court has previously indicated that LDS 
Social Services' conduct under U.C.A. §78-
constitute state action." Sanchez v. L.D|, 
680 P.2d 753, 755 n.2 (Utah 1984). See al 
-30-4 "does not 
S. Social Services, 
lso In re Adoption of 
Baby Boy Doe, 717 P.2d 686, 695 (Utah 1986) (Stewart, J., 
dissenting) (due process does not limit tpe actions of private 
parties involved in adoption process); In the Matter of the 
Petition of Steve B.D., 112 Idaho 22, 7301 P.2d 942, 945-46 
(1986) (mother's concealment of adoption not actionable under 
14th Amendment). That conclusion is undoubtedly correct since 
the adoptive placement of children is notj and traditionally has 
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not been, "the exclusive prerogative of the State." 
Rendell-Baker, supra, at 842; see Presser, "The Historical 
Background of the American Law of Adoption," 11 J. Fam. L. 443 
(1971). As noted above, mere licensing by the State does not 
convert otherwise private conduct into state action. Sumpter, 
supra. Moreover, the fact that defendants acted under authority 
of State law does not render their conduct state action. See 
Larsen v. Kirkham, 499 F. Supp. 960, 964 (D. Utah 1980). 4 
In sum, the district court's judgment finding no state 
action is correct, is not challenged on appeal, and may not be 
disturbed on appeal. 
POINT II: U.C.A. §78-30-4, AS APPLIED IN THIS CASE, DOES NOT 
VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION PROVISION OF THE STATE 
OR FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 
The equal protection provisions of the state and federal 
constitutions require only "that similarly situated people will 
4 
The federal district court in Swayne v. L.D.S. Social 
Services, 670 F. Supp. 1537 (D. Utah 1987), found "state action" 
for purposes of federal jurisdiction. However, that conclusion 
was based on the erroneous assumptions that (1) section 78-30-4 
effects a state-mandated "termination" of paternal rights, 
rather than a self-caused forfeiture of those rights; and (2) 
adoptive placement of children is the "exclusive and traditional 
duty" of the State. id. at 1542-43. This Court is not bound to 
follow the error of the federal court, but rather must follow 
the lead of the Utah Supreme Court in Sanchez, supra. Even if 
the federal Swayne decision were controlling, it would apply 
only to the federal state action question and not to the state 
action issue under the Utah Constitution. 
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be dealt with in a similar manner and that people of different 
their circumstances were 
233, 243 (Utah 1979). 
pature are presumed to 
"facts can reasonably be 
circumstances will not be treated as if 
the same." Baker v. Matheson, 607 P.2d 
Legislative classifications of a social 
be constitutional and must be upheld if 
conceived which would justify the distinctions or differences in 
state policy as between different personb." M . at 244. Some 
inequality in legislative line-drawing i| 
permissible: 
3 inevitable and 
[E]nactments [of a social or economic nature] require 
legislative judgments which accord various weights to 
various shadings of differences in human affairs. 
Razor-thin distinctions which are entirely devoid of some 
arbitrariness are rarely, if everj possible. The 
rationality of the classification is a matter of degree. 
If courts were to insist upon logical precision in 
creating classifications not consistent with the nature 
of the problem to be addressed, legislative power would 
be seriously crippled. . . . I 
For the Legislature to devise effective means for 
dealing with social and economic problems which affect 
people and groups differently, it must frequently be able 
to rely on approximations in deciding which groups fall 
within and which are without the scope of legislation. 
693 P.2d 661, 672 n.16 
ar significance that 
] . . . [t]he real 
Id. at 243-44. See also Malan v. Lewis, 
(Utah 1984). Thus, it is "of no particu]j 
the [statute] in question discriminates[; 
issue is whether the discriminations in tjhis case are 
invidious." Baker, supra, at 244. 
Plaintiff argues that U.C.A. §78-3U-4 violates equal 
protection by treating "similarly situated parents of an 
illegitimate child in a different manner" 
fathers who fail to register their paternity differently from 
and by treating unwed 
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other fathers. (App. Br. 7.) The latter argument comparing the 
rights of unwed fathers to those of other fathers was not made 
in the district court (R. 10, 48, 184), and may not be asserted 
for the first time on appeal. Madsen v. Brown, 701 P.2d 1086, 
1088 (Utah 1985). Therefore, defendants here respond only to 
the argument regarding the statute's different treatment of the 
unwed mother and father. As to the mother and father of 
illegitimate children, section 78-30-4 creates no invidious 
discrimination against the unwed father. 
Section 78-30-4 governs the adoption of illegitimate 
children in Utah. (See Add. 27.) Subsection (1) requires "the 
consent of each living parent having rights in relation to [the] 
child," unless the parent or parents have previously "released 
his or her or their control or custody of such child" to a 
licensed child placement agency. Subsection (3)(a) provides 
that "the father of an illegitimate child may claim rights 
pertaining to his paternity of the child by registering with the 
registrar of vital statistics in the department of health, a 
notice of his claim of paternity . . . and of his willingness 
and intent to support the child to the best of his ability." 
The notice may be registered at any time prior to the birth, but 
must be registered prior to the date the child is relinquished 
to an adoption agency or, in the case of a private adoption, 
before the filing of an adoption petition. Subsection (3)(b). 
If the father timely registers his claim of paternity, any 
adoption of the child is vetoed and may not proceed without his 
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consent. If the father fails to timely register his claim of 
paternity, the mother may relinquish the child for adoption 
without notice to or consent of the father, and the father is 
thereafter barred from asserting his paternity. Subsection 
(3)(c). Thus, the consent or release of the mother is required 
unless her rights have been judicially terminated, while the 
father's consent or release is required only if he timely 
registers a claim of paternity, thereby giving him "rights in 
relation to said child." 
Plaintiff assails this disparate treatment of "two 
similarly situated parents of an illegitimate child" (App. Br. 
7); however, the falsity of plaintiff's premise requires 
rejection of the entire equal protection argument. The two 
parents of an illegitimate child are not similarly situated, as 
recognized from earliest times to the lat|est United States 
Supreme Court decisions: 
Although biologically the putative father of an 
illegitimate child is a parent, at common law there was 
no legally recognized relationship 
father and his illegitimate child, 
law viewed an illegitimate child a 
"the son of no one." . . . 
between a putative 
The English common 
|s filius nullius/ or 
This common law recognition of ajmother's exclusive, 
primary right to the custody of her illegitimate child 
arose from the presumption that the mother was a better 
custodian than the putative fatherf The presumption was 
based upon the ease with which the(mother could be 
identified and located, the obligation normally placed by 
society on the mother to care for and raise her children, 
and the strength of the bonds of love and affection 
assumed to exist between mother and child. 
Comment, "Delineation of the Boundaries of Putative Fathers' 
Rights: A Psychological Parenthood Perspective," 15 Seton Hall 
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L.R. 290, 294-95 (1985). This common law view of a putative 
father's rights has been carried over into modern adoption 
statutes and case law. Ld. at 296-97. However, it should be 
noted that Utah's adoption statute accords rights to unwed 
fathers far beyond those recognized at common law. Under 
section 78-30-4, the registration of paternity not only entitles 
the father to notice of any adoption proceeding, but gives him 
an absolute veto over an adoption. By merely registering his 
paternity, the unwed father acquires rights equal to those of a 
married father. 
Cabam v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979), relied upon by 
plaintiff, did not involve the adoption of an illegitimate 
newborn. Caban held that a statute permitting illegitimate 
children to be adopted with the consent of the unwed mother 
alone, without according the same right of consent to the unwed 
father, violated equal protection as applied to the father of 
older children with whom he had developed a substantial 
relationship. There, the parents lived together for five years 
and held themselves out as husband and wife; the father was 
listed on the children's birth certificates; he lived with the 
children as their father for four years; he contributed to the 
care and support of the family; and he visited and communicated 
with the children even after separating from their mother. Id. 
at 382. Based on these facts, the Court concluded that the 
father's relationship with the children was just as substantial 
as the mother's and that the purpose of the statute was 
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therefore not served by denying the father a voice in the 
adoption, id. at 393-94. 
However, the Caban Court emphasized that the statute's 
different treatment of unwed fathers and mothers would be 
justified in the case of a newborn illegitimate child because 
the father has not yet developed a substantial relationship with 
the child. At birth the mother's relationship with the child is 
closer than the unwed father's, and legislative distinctions 
based on that difference are acceptable. See id. at 389. As 
the Caban Court observed: 
Even if the special difficulties 
and identifying unwed fathers at 
legislative distinction between m 
newborns, these difficulties need 
infancy. . . . In those cases wh^ 
ttendant upon locating 
irth would justify a 
thers and fathers of 
not persist past 
re the father never has 
come forward to participate in the rearing of his child, 
nothing in the Equal Protection Clause precludes the 
State from withholding from him tlje privilege of vetoing 
the adoption of that child. [Id. at 392, emp. added.] 
Other members of the Court in Cab^n echoed the view that 
the unwed mother and father of illegitimate newborns are not 
similarly situated with respect to the cl^ ild: 
With respect to a large group of adoptions--those of 
newborn children and infants--unwed mothers and unwed 
fathers are simply not similarly s 
law has given the unwed mother the 
lituated . . . . 
custody of her 
Our 
illegitimate children precisely because it is she who 
bears the child and because the vast majority of unwed 
fathers have been unknown, unavailable, or simply 
uninterested. This custodial preference has carried with 
it a correlative power in the mother to place her child 
for adoption or not to do so. | 
. . . These common and statutory! 
the physical reality that only the 
gives birth to the child, as well e 
social reality that the unwed moth€ 
identifiable parent and the custodian of the child--until 
or unless the State intervenes. The biological father, 
rules of law reflect 
mother carries and 
is the undeniable 
r is always an 
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unless he has established a familial tie with the child 
by marrying the mother, is often a total stranger from 
the State's point of view. I do not understand the Court 
to question these pragmatic differences. See ante, 392, 
60 L Ed 2d, at 307. An unwed father who has not come 
forward and who has established no relationship with the 
child is plainly not in a situation similar to the 
mother1s. [Id. at 398-99, Stewsurt, J., dissenting, 
citations omitted, emp. added.] 5 
Justice Stevens, joined by two other members of the 
Court, observed: 
Men and women are different, and the difference is 
relevant to the question whether the mother may be given 
the exclusive right to consent to the adoption of a child 
born out of wedlock. . . . 
These differences continue at birth and immediately 
thereafter. During that period, the mother and child are 
together; the mother's identity is known with certainty. 
The father, on the other hand, may or may not be present; 
his identity may be unknown to the world and may even be 
uncertain to the mother. These natural differences 
between unmarried fathers and mothers make it probable 
that the mother, and not the father or both parents, will 
have custody of the newborn infant. 
. . . [A]s a matter of equal protection analysis, it 
is perfectly obvious that at the time and immediately 
after a child is born out of wedlock, differences between 
men and women justify some differential treatment of the 
mother and father in the adoption process. 
Most particularly, these differences justify a rule 
that gives the mother of the newborn infant the exclusive 
right to consent to its adoption. Such a rule gives the 
mother, in whose sole charge the infant is often placed 
anyway, the maximum flexibility in deciding how best to 
care for the child. It also gives the loving father an 
incentive to marry the mother, and has no adverse impact 
on the disinterested father. Finally, it facilitates the 
interests of the adoptive parents, the child, and the 
public at large by streamlining the often traumatic 
adoption process and allowing the prompt, complete, and 
reliable integration of the child into a satisfactory new 
home at as young an age as is feasible. . . . 
(continued) 
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Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (11983), rejected the 
equal protection argument raised by plaintiff in this case on 
facts very similar to the present case. There, the putative 
father of an illegitimate child lived with the mother before the 
baby's birth and visited the mother and baby in the hospital at 
the time of birth. However, he did not place his name on the 
baby's birth certificate, he did not live with the mother and 
baby after the birth, he did not offer to marry the mother, and 
he provided no financial support to the mother and baby. Id. 
at 252. Two years later the mother and her husband filed an 
adoption petition without notice to the father, and one month 
later the father filed a paternity petition in a different 
county. The adoption order was entered pursuant to state law, 
without notice to or consent of the fathei 
judge was aware of the father's paternity 
in a different court. The father thereafter challenged the 
r, even though the 
petition then pending 
(allowed adoption of 
the mother alone, 
constitutionality of the state law which 
illegitimate children with the consent of] 
without the consent of a father who had failed to register a 
timely claim of paternity. Id. at 251-53i. 
(continued) 
With this much the Court does n6t disagree; it 
confines its holding to cases such 
involving the adoption of an older 
wishes of a natural father who previously has 
as the one at hand 
child against the 
participated in the rearing of the 
paternity. Ante, at 392-393, 60 L 
[Id. at 404-08, Stevens, J., dissecting, footnotes and 
citations omitted, emp. added.] 
child and who admits 
Ed 2d, at 307-308. 
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The Lehr Court rejected the father's claim that the state 
law violated equal protection by according greater rights to 
unwed mothers of illegitimate children than to unwed fathers. 
The Court emphasized that "the rights of the parents are a 
counterpart of the responsibilities they have assumed." Id. at 
257. The Court then adopted the view of the four dissenting 
Justices in Caban "identify[ing] the clear distinction between a 
mere biological relationship and an actual relationship of 
parental responsibility." Id. at 259-60. The Court concluded 
that because the father had never established a "substantial 
relationship" with his illegitimate child, the statute did not 
operate to deny equal protection: 
Whereas [the mother] had a continuous custodial 
responsibility for [the child], [the father] never 
established any custodial, personal, or financial 
relationship with her,. If one parent has an established 
custodial relationship with the child and the other 
parent has either abandoned or never established a 
relationship, the Equal Protection Clause does not 
prevent a State from according the two parents different 
legal rights. 
Id. at 267-68, emp. added. See also Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 
U.S. 246, 256 (1978) (rejecting unwed father's equal protection 
claim vis-a-vis married fathers because the unwed father had 
"never shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to 
the daily supervision, education, protection, or care of the 
child"). 
The Utah Supreme Court has upheld section 78-30-4 on 
similar grounds under the State and federal equal protection 
provisions. In Ellis v. Social Services Department, 615 P.2d 
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1250 (Utah 1980), the unwed father, who had developed no 
relationship with his illegitimate child^ relied on Caban to 
challenge the statute's unequal treatment of unwed mothers and 
fathers. The Court easily distinguished 
the father there had developed a substantial relationship with 
his children over a number of years. Th^ Court noted that Utah 
law protects such fathers by recognizing 
) However, the Ellis 
their adoption of 
children by acknowledgment pursuant to section 78-30-12, without 
registration of paternity. (See Add. 27 
Court concluded that where the unwed father has developed no 
such relationship, equal protection does not require that he be 
accorded an adoption veto power equal to the mother's. 615 P.2d 
at 1255.6 
Caban on the fact that 
Plaintiff criticizes Ellis as creating a "Catch 22" 
for unwed fathers, and asserting that it [would be overruled if 
the equal protection issue were re-examirjed. (App. Br. 16-18.) 
Plaintiff misreads Ellis and section 78-30-12. That statute 
does not protect unwed fathers who are merely "willing," or who 
have merely "acknowledged" or admitted their paternity. 
"Adoption by acknowledgment" involves much more, as illustrated 
by Slade v. Dennis, 594 P.2d 898 (Utah 1979), where the unwed 
father was present at the birth, paid thei expenses of birth, 
placed his name on the birth certificate,! timely registered his 
paternity pursuant to 78-30-4(3), and treated the child as his 
own for the first two years of the child's life. Ellis did not 
hold that registration of paternity is always required for 
adoption by acknowledgment. See §78-30-12 ("The foregoing 
provisions of this chapter do not apply to such an adoption.") 
Rather, Ellis merely noted that failure tp register may result 
in loss of the opportunity for adoption by acknowledgment. 
Here, plaintiff assumed the risk that hisi illegitimate child 
would be relinquished by the mother beforp adoption by 
acknowledgement could be attained, and h€ lost. 
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In Wells v. Children's Aid Society, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 
1984), the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed its equal protection 
holding in Ellis; 
Implicit in that decision was the holding that there are 
reasonable bases for the classifications in the statute 
(between unwed mothers and fathers and between fathers 
who file and fathers who do not) and that these 
classifications are reasonably calculated to serve a 
proper government objective. [id. at 204.] 
However, the Wells Court went beyond Ellis in identifying the 
putative father's rights, the State's interest in the adoption 
process, and the justification for according unwed mothers and 
fathers different rights. 
The Wells Court recognized that "an unwed father's right 
to his relationship with his newborn is a provisional right by 
comparison with the vested right of a parent who has fulfilled a 
parental role over a considerable period of time." M . at 206, 
emp. add. The Court explained that the father's right can be 
forfeited pursuant to 78-30-4: 
Although parental rights have their origin in 
biological relationships, those relationships do not 
guarantee the permanency of parental rights. 
Constitutionally protected parental rights can be lost. 
They can be surrendered pursuant to statute. [Ld. at 
202". ] 
Regarding the State's interest in the adoption of 
illegitimate newborns, the Court stated: 
See also Lehr v. Robertson, supra, at 265, where the 
putative father's interest is referred to as "inchoate" until 
perfected by marriage or registration of paternity. 
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There are special problems in defining parental rights 
over newborns who are illegitimate. The identity of the 
father may be unknown. The motheir may desire to give the 
child up for adoption. The state has a strong interest 
in speedily identifying those persons who will assume the 
parental role over such children, I not just to assure 
immediate and continued physical care but also to 
facilitate early and uninterrupted bonding of a child to 
its parents. The state must therefore have legal means 
to ascertain within a very short time of birth whether 
the biological parents (or either of them) are going to 
assert their constitutional rights and fulfill their 
corresponding responsibilities, or whether adoptive 
parents must be substituted. [ld\ at 203.] 
The Court concluded that this "strong interest in immediate and 
secure adoptions for eligible newborns provides a sufficient 
justification for significant variations 
of unwed fathers, who, in contrast to mothers, are not 
automatically identified by virtue of their role in the process 
of birth." Id. 
Plaintiff concedes that the Utah statutory scheme is 
in the parental rights 
("whose identity and 
it is unconstitutional 
tiling fathers." (App. 
permissible with regard to unwed fathers 
location may be unknown," but argues that! 
as applied to "identified, present and wi 
Br. 10.) This reasoning is superficial and faulty. One of the 
major problems encountered with illegitimate children is not 
simply identifying the father, but ascertaining immediately 
whether the father is committed to support the child and to 
assume full legal responsibility for the lifetime care of the 
child. A father who is known and present but uncommitted is of 
no more benefit to the child than a father whose identity and 
location are unknown. The State cannot merely assume that known 
unwed fathers will exercise full parental responsibility for 
-25-
their illegitimate offspring. Accordingly, the Legislature has 
determined that the best way to ascertain conclusively which 
unwed fathers intend to assume full parental responsibility for 
their offspring is to require such fathers to inform the State 
of that intent by registering their paternity before the 
adoption process is commenced by relinquishment or petition. If 
the unwed father is allowed to wait until the adoption process 
is commenced before communicating his interest to the State, the 
crucial care and bonding between parent and child will be 
delayed or interrupted and the State's interest, as identified 
in Wells, will be defeated. 
In this case, plaintiff's paternity and location were 
known, but his legal commitment to the child was not. For 
several months he denied the baby was his; he did not sign the 
birth certificate; he did not pay the hospital expenses; he 
failed to timely register his paternity; he never offered to 
marry Penny; and he had no intention of living with and 
supporting Penny and the baby. To the contrary, he continued 
dating and engaging in sexual relations with other girls during 
the pregnancy and after the birth. He merely assumed that Penny 
would keep the baby for his convenience. Thus, if plaintiff was 
a "willing and responsible" father, no one else knew it. Even 
now, plaintiff wants the baby only for his sister to raise. 
Only after the adoptive parents stepped in to assume plaintiff's 
responsibility, after the bonding between baby and parents had 
begun, did plaintiff step in to belatedly assert his "rights." 
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Under Utah law as construed by this State's highest court, 
plaintiff is too late and may not now se^er the bonds of the 
adoptive family. See also In the Matter!of the Adoption of Baby 
Boy D, 742 P.2d 1059, 1068-69 (Okla. 198$) (same result on 
o 
similar statute). 
In sum, U.C.A. §78-30-4, as applied in this case, did not 
result in unconstitutional discrimination against the plaintiff. 
POINT III; U.C.A. §78-30-4(3), AS APPLIED IN THIS CASE, DOES 
NOT VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS PROVISION OF THE STATE 
OR FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 
The essence of plaintiff's due prdcess argument is that 
section 78-30-4(3) denied him a hearing in which to prove his 
paternal interest in the child and thereby failed to protect his 
"opportunity" to develop a relationship with the child 
Plaintiff does not claim a right to notiq 
(App. Br. 21, 24-26, 28.) This argument 
than a facial attack on the procedural fejatures of the statute 
the Utah Supreme Court 
|e of such a hearing, 
amounts to nothing more 
itself, and has been squarely rejected by 
In Ellis v. Social Services Department, 615 P.2d 1250 
(Utah 1980), the unwed father asserted the same argument as that 
raised in the present case, challenging "the constitutionality 
of the presumption that a father has abandoned his illegitimate 
Q 
Plaintiff also claims that Penny was no more concerned 
for the baby than he was, as evidenced by her relinquishment. 
(App. Br. 9-13.) However, it was Penny who had custody of the 
baby and who provided care and support for the baby. Her 
relinquishment of the baby for adoption cannot be construed as 
"indifference" or "unfitness," but is the highest manifestation 
of her love and concern for the child's b$st interests and 
lifetime care. 
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child where he does not file a timely notice of paternity with 
the Bureau." M. at 1255. The Court characterized the argument 
as claiming denial of procedural due process. _Id. The Court 
upheld the procedural validity of 78-30-4(3), but noted that it 
may violate due process as applied if "it [was] impossible for 
the father to file the required notice of paternity prior to the 
statutory bar, through no fault of his own." Jd. at 1256. 
Since the mother there came to Utah from out-of-state and gave 
birth to the child without the father's knowledge, the Court 
remanded for a determination of whether the father reasonably 
could have known of the time and place of the birth, and could 
thus have protected his rights through a timely registration of 
paternity. Id. 
In two subsequent decisions the Court reaffirmed the 
facial validity of 78-30-4(3) and applied the Ellis 
"impossibility" standard to uphold the statute as applied. In 
Wells v. Children's Aid Society, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984), the 
unwed mother traveled to a distant city within the state to 
deliver the baby and relinquish it for adoption. Throughout the 
pregnancy the father had been "equivocal, never indicating 
positively whether or not he desired to assert his paternal 
rights." Id. at 202. While the father knew of the possibility 
of adoption, he did not mail his claim of paternity until the 
day of the birth, and consequently it was not received by State 
officials until one day after the relinquishment. The Court 
held that the registration was too late and that the statutory 
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termination of the father's rights was vfclid under the State and 
federal due process provisions. 
In upholding the facial validity 6f the statute, the 
Wells Court expressly held that an unwed father's right to a 
relationship with his illegitimate child "can be surrendered 
pursuant to statute," without a showing 0f unfitness or 
abandonment. Id. at 202. The Court recognized the State's 
"compelling interest in speedily identifying those persons who 
will assume a parental role over newborn illegitimate 
children." Jd. at 206. The Court observed: 
Speedy identification is important to immediate and 
continued physical care and it is essential to early and 
uninterrupted bonding between child and parents. If 
infants are to be spared the injury and pain of being 
torn from parents with whom they have begun the process 
of bonding and if prospective parents are to rely on the 
process in making themselves available for adoptions, 
such determinations must also be fjinal and irrevocable. 
[Id. at 206-07.] 10 
The Court held that 78-30-4(3) "is narrowly tailored to achieve 
the purposes identified above." Id. at 207. The Court 
concluded that "[d]ue process does not require that the father 
That disposes of plaintiff's 
is entitled to a "judicial finding of 
abandonment." (App. Br. 23.) The cases 
that point are all distinguishable on the 
with fully vested parental rights, while 
remained "provisional" or inchoate until 
pursuant to 78-30-4(3). See Wells, supra, 
For an enlightening discussion of an adopted child's 
bonding process and the serious detrimental impact that 
disruption of the process causes the child and its adoptive 
family, see Goldstein, Beyond The Best Interests of The Child 
pp. 32-37 (The Free Press, 1973). 
repeated argument that he 
parental unfitness or 
ited by plaintiff for 
ground that they deal 
plaintiff's rights 
tjhey were "surrendered" 
at 206. 
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of an illegitimate child be identified and personally notified 
before his parental right can be terminated." Id. 
The Wells Court also upheld the statute as applied, 
noting that the birth occurred in the same state as the father's 
residence, the father knew of the time of birth and the 
possibility of adoption, and he failed adequately to communicate 
an intent to assert his parental rights. Accordingly, it was 
not "impossible" for the father to timely register his paternity 
"through no fault of his own.." id. at 207-08. 
In Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social Services, 680 P.2d 753 (Utah 
1984), the Court upheld application of 78-30-4(3) on facts much 
more favorable to the father than those in the present case. 
There, the couple lived together, the unwed father knew of the 
pregnancy, he knew the time and place of birth, he visited the 
mother and baby in the hospital, he proposed marriage, and he 
also expressed his desire for the mother and baby to live with 
him. The mother discussed possible adoption with the father, 
and he attempted to sign the birth certificate and register his 
paternity, but was prohibited from registering until after the 
baby had been relinquished. The Court concluded that since the 
father knew of the time and place of birth "and was presumed to 
know the law," his late registration was ineffective. Id. at 
755. The Court reasoned: 
It is of no constitutional importance that Sanchez came 
close to complying with the statute. Because of the 
nature of subject matter dealt with by the statute, a 
firm cutoff date is reasonable, if not essential. 
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. . . [T]he degree of the father's diligence and 
sincerity in trying to establish his parental rights 
. [is] foreign to the statutory provisions. [Id.] 
Most recently, in In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 717 
P.2d 686 (Utah 1986), the Court held that application of the 
statute violated due process, but on facts distinguishable from 
those of the present case. There, the unwed parents lived 
together for over three years, the mother 
out-of-state to have the baby, the mother 
she and the baby would live with him, the 
moved to Utah from 
told the father that 
couple planned to 
marry, and the father was in Arizona locating a home for the 
family when the baby was born prematurely) 
those facts the Court held that the fathe 
id. at 687. On 
b could not reasonably 
have complied with the registration requirement and that his 
late registration should be honored. Ld. at 691. However, the 
Court reaffirmed that due process does nor require actual notice 
of termination of an unwed father's rights "where the father 
knows or should know of the birth and can 
timely action required to avoid the statutory bar." Id. 
The facts of the present case align much more easily with 
Wells and Sanchez than with Ellis and Baby Boy Doe. 
reasonably take the 
11 
11 This Court's decision in In the Matter of K.B.E., 740 
the law as set forth P.2d 292 (Utah App. 1987), adds nothing toj 
in the foregoing decisions of the Utah Supreme Court. That 
case holds simply that where the mother doles not intend to 
relinquish the baby for adoption, but races to the court with a 
petition merely to cut off the father's rights, the father's 
acknowledgment filed within hours after the birth is valid. 
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Plaintiff learned of the pregnancy in October of 1986 and had 
from then until the relinquishment on June 8, 1987 to register 
his claim of paternity. Unlike the fathers in Ellis and Baby 
Boy Doe, plaintiff was a Utah resident, was presumed to know 
Utah law, and had full knowledge of the time and place of 
birth. Like the father in Wells, plaintiff was "equivocal" 
about asserting his paternal rights. See 681 P.2d at 202. He 
knew of the possibility of adoption, yet he refused to sign the 
birth certificate, he paid none of the hospital expenses, there 
were no plans to marry or live together, there was no offer of 
support, and he continued dating other girls as before. As 
Penny testified, it was plaintiff's demonstrated lack of 
commitment to her and the baby that caused her to relinquish the 
baby for adoption. (I Tr. 38.) Like the father in Sanchez, 
plaintiff saw the mother and baby after the birth and "assumed" 
Penny would keep the baby, see 680 P.2d at 755, but he developed 
no relationship with the baby and demonstrated no interest in 
asserting his paternal rights until after the baby was 
12 
relinquished. Thus, plaintiff's statutory forfeiture of his 
paternal rights does not offend due process. 
Plaintiff repeatedly asserts that he saw the baby 
"daily" prior to relinquishment and that his family also visited 
the baby. (App. Br. 22.) Those assertions are unsupported in 
the record. Between Saturday June 6 when Penny left the 
hospital and Tuesday June 9 when Penny physically delivered the 
baby to LDS Social Services, plaintiff saw the baby only once, 
and that was after the relinquishment, at plaintiff's apartment, 
while one of his other girlfriends was present. (See Statement 
of Facts, infra, p. 7.) 
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That conclusion is consistent with the United States 
Supreme Court's due process holding in Lehr v. Robertson, 463 
U.S. 248 (1983). (The facts of Lehr wer< outlined above in 
connection with its equal protection analysis.) The father 
there raised the same argument as plainti) 
statute requiring timely registration of 
paternity does not adequately protect the 
ff does here, that a 
an unwed father's 
father's right to 
demonstrate or develop a relationship with his child. The Court 
distinguished Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. 
• 
645 (1972), relied 
it involved upon by plaintiff here, on the basis that 
termination of a fully "developed parent-child relationship," 
whereas the father in Lehr had no such relationship. 463 U.S. 
at 261. The Court explained: 
When an unwed father demonstrates A full commitment to 
the responsibilities of parenthood by "com[ing] forward 
to participate in the rearing of his child," his interest 
in personal contact with his child acquires substantial 
protection under the Due Process Clause. . . . But the 
mere existence of a biological link does not merit 
equivalent constitutional protection. [JUi.] 
The "biological connection," noted the Court, offers the father 
with the child, but 
require his input or 
"an opportunity" to develop a relationship 
if he fails to do so, due process does not 
consent regarding the child's adoption. la. at 262. The Court 
concluded that the father's "opportunity interest" was 
adequately protected by the State's marriage law and putative 
father registration statute, under which "-phe right to receive 
notice [of an impending adoption] was comp 
father's] control, 
etely within [the 
The possibility that he may have 
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failed to [register his claim of paternity] because of his 
ignorance of the law cannot be sufficient reason for criticizing 
the law itself." Ld. at 263-64. 1 3 The Court added that 
"legitimate state interests in facilitating the adoption of 
young children and having the adoption proceeding completed 
expeditiously . . . justify a trial judge's determination to 
require all interested parties to adhere precisely to the 
14 procedural requirements of the statute." Id. at 265. 
Thus, 78-30-4(3) was applied to plaintiff consistent with 
the due process provisions of the State and federal 
constitutions. 
13 
The Court accepted the Legislature's judgment that "a 
more open-ended notice requirement would merely complicate the 
adoption process, threaten the privacy interests of unwed 
mothers, create the risk of unnecessary controversy, and impair 
the desired finality of adoption decrees." Ld. at 264. 
14 
Plaintiff attempts to distinguish Lehr on the basis 
that "it deals with a wholly different statute." (App. Br. 
30.) However, U.C.A. § 78-30-4(3) is more favorable to unwed 
fathers than the statute upheld in Lehr because the Utah law 
gives registered fathers an absolute veto power over any 
adoption, whereas the New York law allowed registered fathers 
merely to present evidence "relevant to the best interests of 
the child." See Lehr, supra, at 251 n.5. 
Other state courts have upheld similar statutes under due 
process challenges. See, e.g., In the Matter of the Adoption of 
Baby Boy I)# 742 P.2d 1059, 1065-68 (Okla. 1985); B.G. v. H.S. , 
509 N.E.2d 214 (Ind. App. 1987); In the Matter of the Petition 
of Steve B.D., 112 Idaho 22, 730 P.2d 942 (1986). 
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While plaintiff 
U 14 (R.5), he alleged 
POINT IV: PLAINTIFF IS BARRED FROM CHALLENGING 78-30-4(3) 
UNDER ART. I, §11 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION BECAUSE 
HE FAILED TO MAKE THE ARGUMENT IN THE DISTRICT COURT. 
Plaintiff argues that U.C.A. §78-30-4(3)(c) violates the 
open courts provision of the Utah Constitution, Art. I, §11, 
because it purports to bar an unregistered father "from 
thereafter bringing or maintaining any action to establish his 
paternity of the child." (App. Br. 32.) 
mentioned "Art. I, §11" in his Complaint, 
violations of only equal protection and diie process. Moreover, 
plaintiff failed to make the open courts argument to the 
district court (R.10, 48, 184), and the court's Judgment 
contains no ruling on the issue (R. 190, Add. 6 ) . Consequently, 
plaintiff did not properly preserve the argument for assertion 
on appeal. James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801-02 (Utah App. 
1987). 
Even if the open courts argument hkd been preserved for 
sly has not been 
by the past year of 
al systems. Moreover, 
an unwed father's 
appeal, it has no merit. Plaintiff obvious 
denied access to the courts, as evidenced 
litigation in the federal and state judiciji 
the case of Baby Boy Doe illustrates that 
access to the state courts is meaningful ahd may result in the 
remedy demanded. Even where the unwed fatjher is unsuccessful in 
the litigation, as in Wells and Sanchez, the bar provision of 
78-30-4(3)(c) has never been cited as the basis for the 
decision. Neither may the bar provision fairly be classified as 
a statute of repose. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should affirm the 
Judgment of the district court. 
DATED this ^*-day of June, 1988. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
By: -&£»&. 4SZ &{&. 
David M. McConkie 
Merrill F. Nelson 
Attorneys for Defendants-
Respondents 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed four true and 
correct copies of the Respondents' Brief, postage prepaid, this 
^*-day of June, 1988, to the following: 
M. David Eckersley 
HOUPT, ECKERSLEY & DOWNES 
419 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Billy L. Walker, Jr. 
120' North 200 West, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Appellant 
&*!-£ &=~ <&£&* 
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DEC 3 USB? 
OepotvCte* 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN H. SWAYNE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES, 
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, 
Defendants. 
fiMEi/DED 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER DENYING 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
Civil No. C-87-05969 
Judge Homer Wilkinson 
This matter came on for hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction and was heard before the Honorable Judge 
Homer Wilkinson at a special hearing on Novtember 13, 1987. 
Plaintiff was represented by Billy L. Walker and M. David 
Eckersley, and defendants were represented by David M. McConkie 
and Merrill F. Nelson. Following the hearing, the Court took 
the matter under advisement. Based on the testimony and 
exhibits presented at the hearing and the memoranda submitted by 
the parties, the Court hereby enters the following Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Penny Paxman is the natural mother of a child born 
out of wedlock in Salt Lake City, Utah on June 4, 1987. 
Plaintiff is the unwed father of the baby. 
2. Both plaintiff and the mother resided in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, throughout the pregnancy and during all 
times relevant to this matter. 
3. Plaintiff first learned of the pregnancy in October 
of 1986. 
4. Plaintiff and the mother have never been married and 
did not live with each other during the pregnancy. Prior to the 
relinquishment of the baby to LDS Social Services, plaintiff 
never offered to marry the mother, to live with the mother, or 
to financially support the mother or the baby. 
5. Plaintiff and the mother discussed during the 
pregnancy that the mother's parents wanted her to relinquish the 
baby for adoption. 
6. Plaintiff was present in the hospital at the time of 
the birth and visited the mother and baby in the hospital 
following the birth. 
7. Plaintiff was informed of the need to sign an 
acknowledgment of paternity form in the hospital in order to 
have his name entered on the baby's birth certificate as its 
father. The form was provided and made available to plaintiff 
in the hospital but he did not sign it. The baby's birth 
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certificate shows no father and the baby was given the mother's 
surname. 
8. Prior to the relinquishment, plaintiff had assumed 
none of the financial responsibility for %he hospital expenses 
or the baby's support. 
9. On June 8, 1987 the mother signed an Affidavit and 
Release relinquishing care and custody of the baby to defendant 
LDS Social Services to place the baby for adoption. LDS Social 
Services subsequently placed the baby with adoptive parents, 
with whom the baby has since resided. 
10. The mother did not notify plaintiff before 
relinquishing the baby for adoption. 
11. On June 13, 1987 the mother informed plaintiff that 
she had relinquished the baby for adoption. 
12. On June 15, 1987 the plaintiff registered his 
acknowledgment of paternity with the Bureau of Vital Statistics 
and applied for an amendment to the birth certificate to 
designate himself as father of the child. 
13. It was not impossible for plaintiff to have filed 
his notice of claim of paternity prior to tjhe date the child was 
relinquished for adoption. 
14. Throughout the pregnancy, plainrciff did not behave 
I 
in a manner consistent with that of a concerned, committed 
father, nor did he clearly articulate an intent or desire to 
assume the responsibilities of parenthood or to keep and rear 
the child. 
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15. Plaintiff testified that if he were awarded custody 
of the child he would relinquish it to his sister to care for. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. In view of controlling case law, it is unlikely that 
plaintiff will prevail on his claims that Utah Code Annotated 
§78-30-4(3) violates the equal protection and due process 
clauses of the state and federal constitutions, either on its 
face or as applied. 
2. 3t does not appear from the evidence that plaintiff 
would suffer irreparable injury by leaving the baby in adoptive 
custody pending resolution of the merits of the lawsuit. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, and the Court having fully considered the evidence and 
arguments presented, it is hereby ordered that plaintiff's 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction be denied. 
DATED this sf ' day of December, 1987. 
BY THE COURT 
•4-
04 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify I caused to be mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order Denying Preliminary Injunction postage prepaid, this 
day of December, 1987, to: 
Billy L. Walker, Jr. 
120 North 200 West, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
M. David Eckersley 
Houpt, Eckersley & Downes 
419 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
David M. McConkie, No. 2154 
Merrill F. Nelson, No, 3841 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
Attorneys for Defendants 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2599 
Telephone: (801) 521-3680 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN H. SWAYNE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES, 
JOHN DOE AND JANE DOE, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C-87-05969 
Judge Homer Wilkinson 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment came on for 
hearing before the Honorable Homer Wilkinson on March 4, 1988. 
Plaintiff was represented by M. David Eckersley; Defendants 
were represented by David M. McConkie and Merrill F. Nelson. 
The Court, having reviewed and considered the pleadings, 
depositions, affidavits, memoranda and exhibits submitted by the 
parties, as well as the testimony and findings from the prior 
hearing on plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, hereby 
enters final judgment as follows: 
1. The record contains no genuine issue as to any 
material fact. 
2. The challenged acts of defendants do not constitute 
state action under 42 U.S.C. §1983 or unper the due process and 
equal protection provisions of either the United States 
Constitution or the Utah Constitution. 
3. Utah Code Ann. §78-30-4 is valid, on its face and as 
applied to the facts of this case, under both the due process 
and equal protection provisions of both the United States and 
Utah Constitutions. 
4. Defendants' motion for summary judgment is hereby 
granted, and plaintiff's action is dismissed. 
5. Defendants are awarded their costs pursuant to 
U.R.Civ.P. 54(d). 
DATED this / / day of March, 1988f 
Approved as to Form: 
M. Dftvid Eckersle^/? 
C 
Hon. Horner Wilkinson 
D i s t r i c t Court Judge 
QeZVi* &** 
o 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand-delivered a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment, this f day 
of March, 1988, to: 
M. David Eckersley 
Houpt, Eckersley & Downes 
419 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Billy L. Walker, Jr. 
120 North 200 West, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
sfr* 'U ^ 
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David M. McConkie, No. 2154 
Merrill F. Nelson, No. 3841 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
Attorneys for Defendants 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2599 
Telephone: (801) 521-3680 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FpR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN H. SWAYNE, : 
: AFFIDAVIT OF 
Plaintiff, : HAR0LD BROWN 
vs. : 
L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES, : Civil No. C-87-05969 
JOHN DOE AND JANE DOE, 
Jud^ re Homer Wilkinson 
Defendants. : 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Harold Brown, being first duly s^orn, depose and state 
as follows: 
1. I am the Director of LDS Social Services. 
2. LDS Social Services is a private, nonprofit welfare 
agency licensed by the State of Utah as a qualified child 
placement agency pursuant to U.C.A. §55-8a-l et sea. 
3. No governmental agency or entity is involved in the 
internal operations, affairs, or decisions of LDS Social 
Services, except as expressly authorized by the licensing 
statute. 
4. LDS Social Services receives no government funding. 
5. No governmental agency or entity was involved in 
Penny Paxman's relinquishment and LDS Social Services1 
acceptance of the custody and control of her baby on June 8, 
1987, or in the decision to transfer custody and control of the 
baby from LDS Social Services to the adoptive parents. 
DATED this day of February, 1988. 
Harold Brown 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 2£&Pday of 
February, 1988. 
My Commission Expires: 
fc ~£R -£T NOTARY" PUBLIC / * /o~7 
Residing in: \JAjy-^>iJpj fc/& (sjxJ__ 
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David M. McConkie, No. 2154 
Merrill F. Nelson, No. 3841 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
Attorneys for Defendants 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2599 
Telephone: (801) 521-3680 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAHI 
STEVEN H. SWAYNE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES, 
JOHN DOE AND JANE DOE, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
FENNI JEAN PAXMAN 
CiVil No. C-87-05969 
Judge Homer Wilkinson 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Penni Jean Paxman deposes and states that: 
1. At all times relevant to this action I have resided r 
with my parents in their home in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. I began dating Steven Swayne in late 1985 and 
learned in October of 1986 that I had become pregnant by him. 
When I informed Steven that I was pregnant, he became angry and 
at first denied that the baby was his. ~M-^r _/rf&re>A-
a/Jo oO-szu~Lec£ ZI/T-LJ £>u-X>y<-J~mc AyjL-^L/j 
3. In approximately March of 1987,| Steven and I 
dracussed the fact that my parents wanted me to place the baby 
/</B7 /u<J> 
11 
for adoption. I called LDS Social Services during that same 
month to make an appointment to discuss placing the baby for 
adoption, but later decided to postpone the appointment. 
4. Steven never offered to marry me or to live with and 
support me and the baby. He suggested that, if I did keep the 
baby, I could live with his mother in her apartment. It was 
understood that I would be expected to support myself and pay 
half the rent. 
5. During the time I was dating Steven, I often gave 
him money to pay his apartment rent and other expenses. I knew 
that during the time we were dating, both before and during my 
pregnancy, Steven was also dating and having sexual relations 
with other girls. I also knew that he had previously fathered a 
baby out of wedlock and that the baby had been placed for 
adoption. 
6. Ny baby was born in a Salt Lake City hospital on 
June 4, 1987. Steven knew of the birth and visited me in the 
hospital. During one of Steven1s visits to the hospital, I 
informed him that in order to have his name entered on the 
baby's birth certificate as the father he would have to sign a 
paternity form. I showed the form to Steven but he did not 
sign it, and his name was not entered on the birth certificate. 
(See attached exhibit.) On June 6, 1987, my baby and I were 
discharged from the hospital and I took the baby home to my 
12 
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parents' house. Steven has paid none of the hospital expenses 
or expenses to support me and the baby. 
7. On June 8, 1987, I took the baby to LDS Social 
Services to receive counseling regarding placing my baby for 
adoption. My parents went with me. The counselor at LDS Social 
Services, Elda Bowen, explained to me the adoption process. 
When Mrs. Bowen asked about the baby's father, I explained to 
her that Steven had no interest in marriage or in living with 
and supporting me and the baby. Both Mrsl Bowen and my parents 
told me that the decision to place the baby for adoption was 
mine alone to make. Mrs. Bowen told me that if I was not sure 
about placing the baby for adoption, I ^ould place the baby in 
temporary foster care until I made my decision. After 
considering all of the circumstances, such 
interest in me and the baby, my inability to support and rear 
the baby alone, the problems of bringing a 
into a possible marriage with another man, 
as Steven's lack of 
racially-mixed baby 
and the needs of the 
baby to have a good home, I decided that it would be best for 
the baby to place her for adoption. 
8. Mrs. Bowen reviewed with me th^ release form and 
asked me if I understood what I was doing. I told her that I 
understood the form and its effect and thati I wanted to do what 
was best for the baby. I then signed the form releasing the 
care and custody of my baby to LDS Social Services. 
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9. I asked Mrs. Bowen if I could take the baby home 
that night and bring her in the next day. Mrs. Bowen agreed, 
and I returned the baby to LDS Social Services the next day. 
DATED this ^ day of February, 1988. 
\^> &^y(^jfe^sn a^<^/ 
Penni Jean Paxman 
SUBSCRIBED AND*?W5RN to before me this <C?^ day of 
February, 1988. 
My Commission Expires: 
&l(^A>y;p^ /ffo NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in: jtf*uM£/l/ J6ZA 
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David M. McConkie, No. 2154 
Merrill F. Nelson, No. 3841 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
Attorneys for Defendants 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3680 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN H. SWAYNE, : 
: AFFIDAVIT OF 
Plaintiff, : ELDA C. BOWEN 
v. : 
L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES, : Civil No. C-87-05969 
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, : 
: Judge Homer Wilkinson 
Defendants. : 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: BS 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Elda C. Bowen deposes and states that: 
1. I am a resident of the State of Utah. 
2. I am an employee of LDS Social Services, a child 
placement agency licensed to receive children for placement or 
adoption pursuant to Title 55, Chapter 8a, Utah Code Annotat-
ed, 1953. 
3. I am employed by LDS Social Services as a social 
worker specializing in counseling with unwed mothers. I have 
been employed in this position by LDS Social Services for the 
past sixteen years. 
4. Penny Jean Paxman called the Sandy office of LDS 
Social Services on March 10, 1987 and made an appointment to 
meet with me the next day to discuss possible adoptive place-
ment of the baby she was expecting. Penny subsequently called 
and cancelled the appointment. 
5. Following the birth of Penny's baby, an appoint-
ment was made for me to meet with Penny on June 8, 1987. On 
that day, Penny brought the baby with her tJo my office to 
discuss placing the baby for adoption. Penny's parents were 
also present at that meeting. I inquired apout the baby's 
father, and Penny told me that he had indicated no interest in 
forming a family unit, in supporting the baby, or in planning 
for the baby's future. I explained the adoption process, 
i 
stressed to Penny that whether to relinquish the baby was her 
decision alone, and informed her that she could place the baby 
decision. Penny 
be best for the 
in temporary foster care until she made her 
decided at that meeting that adoption would 
baby. 
6. During that same meeting, I telephoned the Bu-
reau of Vital Statistics of the Utah Department of Health and 
inquired whether an Acknowledgement of Paternity had been 
filed for Penny's baby. I was informed that an Acknowledge-
ment had not been filed. 
7. I then showed a relinquishment form to Penny 
entitled "AFFIDAVIT AND RELEASE". (Exhibit ^, attached here-
to.) I filled in the preliminary information and read aloud 
the entire form from beginning to end as Penny followed 
along. I asked her if she understood the form and the effect 
of signing it and was doing so by her own free will and 
choice. She responded affirmatively to those questions and 
then signed the form. After signing, Penny expressed her 
relief and her belief that it was the right decision. 
8. Penny asked if she could take the baby home 
overnight and return her the next day. I consented, and Penny 
returned the baby to me at my office at 5:00 p.m. on June 9, 
1987. LDS Social Services transferred custody of the baby to 
her adoptive parents on June 12, 1987. 
DATED this <$A_ day of February, 1988. 
Elda C. Bowen 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this day of 
February, 1988. 
My Commission Expires: 
/Residing at 
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- " FYWTBTT k AF )AVIT Ar!0 RELEASE 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 6 A T H © * * f l 
I, y~?/issi*e-<:/K-/f&'i^' / ^aV^T^a/^ /be ing firstjdulysworn on oath, depose and s. 
T Thaf J am the parent of a minor child, namely /6n A>±S G"-/ /^jtrrTQ^' 
born on the >/zx^.^/? day of t / / / / i y A . IS B7; at** ^T.JL.CL 
County of , ^ z / State of / , T / > ^> .1 
2 . That because I feel the c h i l d ' s best In t e res t s wi l l be served, I hereby rele2S 
said child to the care , custody and control of the LOS Social Serv ices , ' fo r placement fo 
adoption pursuant to the Utah Code Annotated § 55-8a-l fit s e c . (1953). 
3 . That I ful ly understand and am aware of the fact t h a t by my act ion , I am relea: 
and do hereby so r e l ease , my parental r igh ts with regard to said c h i l d , and in fac t , autr 
the LOS Social Services to exercise i t s d iscre t ion in the placement of said chi ld . 
4 . That, fur ther , I do hereby consent to the legal adoption of said child by those 
persons whom the said LOS Social Services may, in t h e i r d i s c r e t i on , designate and approve 
be adopting parents who are able to furnish said chi ld with a proper name, home and care . 
5. That I fu l ly understand and consent tha t the said LOS Social Services may, in i t 
d i s c r e t i on , re lease the ca re , custody, and control over s^id minor chi ld to another licens 
ch i ld placement agency for adoption and placement within said other agency's d i sc re t ion , 
i f t h i s i s deemed necessary to serve the best i n t e r e s t s of the ch i ld . 
6 . That I hereby waive notice of any and a l l legal proceedings which may be held in 
Courts of the State of Utah, or elsewhere, for the purpose of determination or release 
»nd the adoption of said chi ld or any thereof. 
7. That I have read the foregoing statement and I fjully understand the impact of 
he terms and conditions to which I do agree, and consent; and that my action herein taken 
s of my own free will, executed voluntarily without any coercion, force, or duress, and 
ithout any promises of any kind whatsoever, except that tlpe best interests of said child 
i l l be the paramount, controlling factor'fh its placement] 
tness / ) Signature of Parent t  /~l 
t n o c t f tness 
VTE OF UTAH ) 
INTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
OIL the «&&£ day of 0/^J>S * 19 t/ , personally appeared before 
&&>**t*? 0/s^S 6 ^ ^ < L 4 ^ , the signer j>f the foregoing instrument, who 
^iecgecytayfie tna t sne/fie ex ncmtzzezAO'rte t t s /fi  ecuted tne same. 
otory Public 
onmissicn expires: 
» ~ ~ Aodress ** 
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David M. McConkie, No. 2154 
Merrill F. Nelson, No. 3841 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
Attorneys for Defendants 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2599 
Telephone: (801) 521-3680 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN H. SWAYNE, : 
: AFFIDAVIT OF 
Plaintiff, : JOHN E. BROCKERT 
vs. : 
L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES, : Civil No. C-87-05969 
JOHN DOE AND JANE DOE, : 
: Judge Homer Wilkinson 
Defendants. : 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
John E. Brockert, being first duly sworn deposes and says 
as follows: 
1. I am a director of the Bureau of Vital Records for 
the State of Utah. 
2. The revised Utah vital statistics rules which became 
effective March 17, 1987, specify in Rule 405-3-4 (attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A") that a child born to an unmarried mother 
may not have the father's name entered on a birth certificate 
unless the mother and father sign an acknowledgment of paternity 
(attached hereto as Exhibit "B"). 
3. Rule 3.4 has been in effect since March 17, 1987 and 
has been a requirement since 1972 for all births occurring in 
the State of Utah. 
DATED this day of February, 1$88. 
giLLh 
John E. Iprockert, Director of 
Vital Records 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me ^his ;Ay day of 
February, 1988. 
My Tonupission Expires: 
FARY PUi 
Residing IS^/Us/U 
-2-
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This amendment shall be processed In the manner prescribed 1n Section 3.2 of 
these rules. 
Rule 3.4 Acknowledgement of Paternity by Natural Parents 
A child born to an unmarried mother may not have the father's name entered on 
the birth certificate unless the mother and father sign an acknowledgement of 
paternity. If the acknowledgement of paternity 1s signed and received before 
the certificate 1s registered, the father's name and other related Information 
may be entered 1n the appropriate Items on the original certificate. The 
acknowledgement of paternity 1s transmitted with the original certificate to 
the State Registrar, where 1t 1s retained as documentary evidence. 
An acknowledgement of paternity received after the certificate 1s registered 
1s not acceptable for registration. Alternatively, the father's information 
M y be added by amendment as specified 1n Rule 3.2. However, 1f another man 
1s shown as the father of the child on the original certificate, the 
correction can only be made following a judicial determination of paternity or 
following adoption. 
RULE 4 Oelayed Registration of Birth (Section 26-2-8) 
Rule 4.1 Registration - Ten Oays to One Year 
Certificates of birth filed after ten days, but within one year from the date 
of birth, shall be registered on the standard birth certificate 1n the manner 
prescribed in Section 26-2-5, Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended. Such 
certificate shall not be marked •Delayed.11 
- 5 -
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Utah State Department of Health 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF PATERNITY 
BY PARENTS 
We 
Fether of Child 
and 
hereby acknowledge that 
of the 
Sex of Child 
(name of father) 
.child born 
Mother of Child 
is the natural father 
Birthplace 
Hospttel (or ed dress) City 
to 
Meiden name of mother 
Of 
Birthdate 
County 
Mother's usual residence 
It is our desire that the father's information become a part of the birth certificate qf our child. 
Name of Child 
First Middle 
Yame of Father 
Last 
First 
\ge of Father at time of this child's birth 
birthplace of Father 
Signature (Mother) 
Middle 
Father's Birthdate. 
List 
Race of rather 
Address 
I hereby acknowledge paternity of the child identified above. This is to signify 
port this child to the best of my ability. 
lignature (Father) Address 
my willingness and intent to sup-
ubscnbed and sworn to before me this day of ,19 
(SEAL) % 
>DH.BHS-46 10/79 
My Commission Expires 
g new re Notary Public 
Address 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
N L E D 
APR 131989 
T.>:-,o««y M. Shna 
Clerk of the Court 
Olan Court of Appeal 
Steven H. Swayne, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
L.D.S. Social Services, John Doe 
and Jane Doe, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
ORDER DENYING 
SUMMARY REVERSAL 
AND NOTICE OF HEARING 
Court of Appeals No. 880177-CA 
Appellant's motion for summary reversal of the trial court's 
judgment is hereby denied. 
Appellant's motion for injunction pending appeal is hereby 
scheduled for hearing on Monday, April 18, 1988 at the hour of 1:30 
p.m. 
Dated this /g day of April, 1988. 
BY THE COURT 
-<Z^&f*"****» <5^Q**v^*><-
NORMAN H.JACKSON, Judge 
APP14198P! 
24 
f- I L b L) 
\J +-< 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF /^ PPEALS 
OOOOO 
CienfTSTtf^T CCHSt 
Steven H. Swayne, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
L.D.S. Social Services, et al. 
Defendants and Respondents. 
ORDER 
Case No. 880177-CA 
Before Judges Jackson, Orme and Greenwood (On Law and Motion). 
Appellant's motion for injunction pending appeal is hereby 
denied. 
The Court further determines that the best interests of the 
minor child and of the parties require that this appeal be 
scheduled for expedited briefing and hearing. Therefore, 
pursuant to R. Utah Ct. App. 2, the Court orders as follows: 
1. Appellant's brief shall be filed with this Court and 
served on or before May 10, 1988; 
2. Respondent's brief shall be filed 
served on or before June 9, 1988; 
with this Court and 
3. Appellant's reply brief shall be filed with this Court 
on or before June 16, 1988; 
4. All designated portions of the record on appeal shall 
be filed with this Court on or before June 10, 1988; and 
5. Hearing on oral argument shall be held on Tuesday, June 
21, 1988, at 2:00 p.m., before a regularly scheduled panel 
of this Court. 
DATED this 20th day of April, 1988. 
FOR THE COURT: 
AMENDMENTS 
TO THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without du 
process of law. 
tec. 11. [Courts open—ftodrtss of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and eTery person, for an injury done to him 
in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course 
of law, which shall be.administered without denial or unnecessary delay; 
and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before 
any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which 
he is a party. 
Sec. 31 [Uniform operation of laws] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
76-30-4. Consent to adoption — Paternity claims. 
(1) A child cannot be adopted without the consent of each living parent 
having rights in relation to said child, except that consent is not necessary 
from a father or mother who has been judicially deprived of the custody of the 
child on account of cruelty, neglect or desertion; provided, that the district 
court may order the adoption of any child, without notice to or consent in court 
of the parent or parents thereof, whenever it shall appear that the parent or 
parents whose consent would otherwise be required have theretofore, in writ-
ing, acknowledged before any officer authorized to take acknowledgments, 
released his or her or their control or custody of such child to any agency 
licensed to receive children for placement or adoption under Chapter 8a, Title 
55, and such agency consents, in writing, to such adoption or whenever it 
shall appear that the parent or parents whose, consent would otherwise be 
required have theretofore, in writing, released his or her or their control, 
custody, and all parental rights and interests in such child to any agency 
licensed or authorized by statute to receive children for placement or adoption 
in any state pursuant to that state's laws and said agency has in turn, in 
writing, released its control and custody of such child to any agency licensed 
under Chapter 8a, Title 55, or to any person, or persons, selected by that 
agency licensed under Utah law, as adoptive patents for said child, and such 
Utah agency consents, in writing, to such adoption. 
(2) A minor parent shall have the power to consent to the adoption of such 
parent's child, and a minor parent shall have the power to release such par-
ent's control or custody of such parent's child to any agency licensed to receive 
children for placement or adoption under Chapter 8 [Chapter 8a], Title 55, 
and, such a consent or release so executed shall be valid and have the same 
force and effect as a consent or release executed by an adult parent. A minor 
parent, having so executed a release or consent, cannot revoke the same upon 
such parent's attaining the age of majority. 
(3) (a) A person who is the father or claims to be the father of an illegiti-
mate child may claim rights pertaining to his paternity of the child by 
registering with the registrar of vital statistics in the department of 
health, a notice of his claim of paternity of an illegitimate child and of his 
willingness and intent to support the child to the best of his ability. The 
department of health shall provide forms for the purpose of registering 
the notices, and the forms shall be made available through the depart-
ment and in the office of the county clerk in every county in thi6 state. 
(b) The notice may be registered prior to the birth of the child but must 
be registered prior to the date the illegitimate child is relinquished or 
placed with an agency licensed to provide adoption services or prior to the 
filing of a petition by a person with whom the mother has placed the child 
for adoption. The notice shall be signed by the registrant and shall in-
clude his name and address, the name and last known address of the 
mother, and either the birthdate of the child or the probable month and 
year of the expected birth of the child. The department of health shall 
maintain a confidential registry for this purpose. 
(c) Any father of such child who fails to file and register his notice of 
claim to paternity and his agreement to support the child shall be barred 
from thereafter bringing or maintaining any action to establish his pater-
nity of the child. Such failure shall further constitute an abandonment of 
said child and a waiver and surrender of any right to notice of or to a 
hearing in any judicial proceeding for the adoption of said child, and the 
consent of such father to the adoption of such child shall not be required. 
(d) In any adoption proceeding pertaining to an illegitimate child, if 
there is no showing that the father has consented to the proposed adop-
tion, it shall be necessary to file with the court prior to the granting of a 
decree allowing the adoption a certificate from the department of health, 
signed by the state registrar of vital statistics which certificate shall state 
that a diligent search has been made of the registry of notices from fa-
thers of illegitimate children and that no registration has been found 
pertaining to the father of the illegitimate child in question. 
78-30-12. Adoption by acknowledgment 
The father of an illegitimate child, by publicly acknowledging it as his own, 
receiving it as such with the consent of his wife, if he is married, into his 
family, and otherwise treating it as if it were a legitimate child, thereby 
adopts it as such, and such child is thereupon deemed for all purposes legiti-
mate from the time of its birth. The foregoing provisions of this chapter do not 
apply to such an adoption. 
